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A “near miss” is an unpleasant event that did not result in injury, illness, or damage but had the potential to do so, but for a
fortunate break in the chain of events. We present a near-miss case which occurred in the MR suite of a tertiary care hospital.
Although the MR is considered a very safe procedure, if MR safety guidelines are not adhered to, adverse and catastrophic events
to the extent of patient deaths are known to have occurred. It is hoped that this incident will prompt hospitals to document and
follow MR safety protocols for patient and staﬀ safety. Although MRI is an extremely safe procedure rarely MR adverse incidents
have resulted in serious physical injury or even death. The incident is an eye opener regarding potential adverse events lurking in
the relatively safe MR environment and provides an opportunity to rectify the inadequacies in MR safety.
1.Introduction
A “near miss” is an unpleasant event that did not result
in injury, illness, or damage but had the potential to do
so, but for a fortunate break in the chain of events. A
human error compounded with a faulty system invariably
permits or compounds the harm and should be the focus of
improvement. We present one such event in the MRI section
of a tertiary care hospital with the aim of identiﬁcation and
correction of the loopholes in the system, to ensure safety of
patients, their attendants, staﬀ, and equipment installations.
T h ec a s eh a si t si m p o r t a n c ea sv e r yf e ws u c hc a s e sh a v eb e e n
reported and literature review did not reveal reporting of any
near-miss case.
2. Case History
A ﬁfty-ﬁve-year-old man was taken up for MRI of the lum-
bosacral spine for detecting metastases from bronchogenic
carcinoma of the lung. He was accompanied by his son
(a government security oﬃcer) who was allowed with him
for assistance in the MRI scanner room. Both the patient
and accompanying person were verbally asked to remove
all ferromagnetic unsafe objects, from their possession. The
accompanyingpersonworeajacketwithapistolintheinside
pocket, which was inadvertently forgotten and not removed.
As a result when the patient’s son neared the magnet, he
felt a strong pull towards the magnet of the scanner. He
was frightened and quickly pulled of his jacket which ﬂew
to the magnetic bore where it was lodged. The examination
was abandoned at the time. Fortunately, the jacket could be
removed along with the pistol by a careful and sustained
pull, without quenching the magnet without damage to all
the persons in the magnet room, computer room, or the
equipment (see Figure 1). Otherwise, quenching the magnet
would have been required as suggested by engineering
department.
3. Discussion
Accidents in the MR facilities have been reported in the
literature and have occasionally proven lethal. According to a
case report, a thumb locked ﬁrearm once discharged sponta-
neously in an MR section of a hospital [2]. Fortunately, none
was injured and only minimal cosmetic damage occurred
to the magnet. In the case under discussion, although
the pistol of the oﬃcer was dual locked, the magnetic2 Case Reports in Radiology
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Figure 1: Photograph showing jacket with pistol caught in the
magnetic bore.
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Figure 2: Swiss cheese model of the near-miss incident.
pull could have unlocked the pistol and a potentially fatal
accident could have occurred. Chaljub et al. have presented
cases of oxygen/nitrous cylinder turned projectile, accidents
in the magnetic ﬁeld vicinity of MR facilities [3]. These
incidents resulted in huge ﬁnancial liabilities, either as legal
compensation to the patient (one patient sustained a facial
fracture) or as repair and restoration of the MR equipment.
These events which led to the near-miss accident in the
tertiary care hospital are discussed hereunder and depicted
in the Swiss Cheese Model (Figure 2).
These were (a) faulty design and consequent improper
zoning of the MRI section of the hospital, (b) unrestricted
access of patients and their attendants, (c) incomplete
screening partly due to (d) inadequate training of the
personnel, including doctors and technologists, and (e)
absence of signage and posters. When all the holes signifying
thesequenceofeventslinedupinthecheese,the“near-miss”
incident occurred.
ThedesignoftheMRIfacilityofthehospitalinwhichthe
near-miss event occurred does not conform to the standards.
As a result, the zones of the facility lack a functional ﬂow
pattern. Entry to zone 4 (MR Scanner Room) directly
opens to the corridor (zone I) of the Department of Radio-
diagnosis and Imaging, through which patients and their
attendants approach the CAT scan facility. Whenever the MR
scanner door opens, a potential catastrophe awaits as critical
patients on portable oxygen cylinder traverse through this
corridor while being taken for CT scan (Figure 3).
Incidents have been reported when oxygen cylinders
turned into projectiles, once they were inadvertently brought
into the vicinity of the magnetic ﬁeld. One fatality, many
injuries and damage to the magnet have thus been reported
[3, 4]. According to the ACR Guidance Document for Safe
MR practices: 2007, the facility should be designed so that
proper zoning is maintained. The zones should have a
functional relationship so that entry happens only from the
lower to a higher zone (Figure 4).
Non-MR Personnel including attendants of patients
enter zone III of the hospital’s MR facility, when there are
strict guidelines about site access restriction to MRI facility.
AccordingtotheACRGuidanceDocument-2007,thepatient
and the accompanying person (if absolutely needed) are
under strict supervision of level I and level II MR persons in
zone III, and level II MR person in zone IV. The supervision
is either direct visual or through audiovisual monitoring [1].
The screening form is inadequately ﬁlled by the referring
physician. The patient is not required to ﬁll the form,
nor is the form translated into locally used languages.
Although the patient is interviewed by the MR physician
regarding any metal implant or related contraindications
and precautions, a metal detector is seldom used although a
ferromagnetic detector is available. Similarly, if an attendant
must accompany a patient, an adequate screening is not
performed.
Guidelines recommend that screening of the patient be
performed in zone II by two individuals; one of these should
be a level II MR person. The screening should be verbal
interactive as well as written [5–7]. Instead of conventional
airport type detectors, only ferromagnetic detectors should
be used in the MR facilities [8, 9].
Only the faculty of the Department of Radiodiagno-
sis have been trained at the time of installation of the
equipment, that is, ﬁve years back. Therefore, in reality,
all the personnel working in the MRI section are non-MR
personnel. ACR guidelines stress that personnel including
radiologists and technologists must undergo training every
year to qualify as MR personnel [1].
Although hazard signs are posted at the entry of zone IV
of the MR section, the red light signifying that the “magnet
is on” is not visible at the site, as a result of which no caution
is aﬀected. Posters for education and awareness of public
are conspicuously absent. A gauss line has not been drawn;
therefore, the magnetic eﬀect in the vicinity is unknown.
Furthermore, an MR safety manual is not available and
hence not used. Policies and procedures regarding safety in
the MR environment are not clearly laid down.
4. Conclusion
Although MRI is an extremely safe procedure if MR safety
instructions are adhered to and MR safe policies and
procedures are followed, rarely MR adverse incidents have
resultedinseriousphysicalinjuryorevendeath.TheincidentCase Reports in Radiology 3
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Figure 3: Floor plan of the MRI facility of the hospital.
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Figure 4: Idealized sample ﬂoor plan illustrates site access restriction considerations [1].
was an eye opener regarding potential adverse events lurking
in the relatively safe MR environment and provides an
opportunity to rectify the inadequacies in MR safety. It
is recommended that guidelines should be followed, MR
safety manual developed and used. Adequate screening and
warningsystemsshouldbeestablished.Asystemofreporting
of the near-miss/adverse incidents should be established in
the hospital [10].
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